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contracted out some or all of their waste management services. This Commentary shows that
where municipal employees provide the bulk of waste services, such as in the cities of Toronto
(and many others in Ontario), Vancouver, and Calgary, municipalities could reduce the costs
of their waste services through increased contracting. Contracting can also be used to attain
other municipal policy goals, such as increased recycling rates, if municipalities are willing to
provide incentive payments for contractors who meet specified goals. 
Through a comprehensive analysis of the finances of all Ontario municipalities, this
Commentary finds:
• Municipalities  with fully contracted waste services have substantially lower average
costs per household than municipalities with few of their services provided through
contracts. 
￿ Further, cost savings are particularly strong when collection services are provided by
private contractors, but recycling and waste disposal contracting are equally cost-
effective when contracted out to other nearby municipalities. 
However, cost savings from contracting will be apparent only if municipalities follow certain
guidelines. Contracts should be written in a manner that clearly defines municipally-
monitored outcomes, and not specific processes, that contractors must meet. Municipalities
might retain ownership of municipality-specific assets, such as landfills or waste-to-energy
facilities, but contract out their operation, to prevent contractors from monopolizing local
infrastructure that cannot be easily replaced. Municipalities can also retain a role for public
employees in waste services by opening bidding for waste services to both private contractors
and current public employees.
Municipal policymakers who contract out waste services through a well-designed contracting
mechanism can reduce the costs of providing waste services and limit the consequences of
municipal strikes.
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T
he provision of waste manage-
ment services by municipal
employees is becoming much less
common as modern Canadian cities
increasingly contract out these traditionally
government-run services to essentially
private operators. But what benefits do
municipalities derive by shifting this
responsibility to the private sector? and
how should this transition be managed?
This Commentary examines municipal waste services
in Ontario to see if contracting out indeed reduces
costs for municipalities. While municipalities that
have fully contracted out their waste collection and
recycling services tend to have the lowest average
operating costs, they also expose themselves to the
potential long-term costs of being held captive to
contractors in later rounds of bidding, and a reduction
in competition for contracts. Many of the issues on
which individual municipalities must base their
decisions are inherently local – for example, the terms
of existing collective agreements with municipal
employees, the amount of competition among private
waste services providers, and the presence of nearby
municipalities that can provide services through inter-
municipal cooperation. The analysis shows, however,
that Canadian municipalities would enjoy substantial
cost savings by contracting out waste collection
services to private hands, as long as the anti-
competitive risks of doing so are addressed. Waste
diversion and disposal services also could be provided
at lower cost, through either private or inter-
municipal contracting. 
In contracting out, municipalities should ensure
that there is a large number of bidders, that contracts
do not entrench incumbent firms, and that
important municipal goals, such as encouraging
recycling or preserving public-sector jobs, are met.
Municipalities also should design contracting
procedures that allow for a tax-neutral comparison 
of public and private costs and provide for the
monitoring and enforcement of contract terms.
The analysis in this Commentary relates almost
exclusively to waste services provided to single-family
residential houses or small-scale multi-residential
apartments. The reason for this focus is that residents
of these kinds of buildings usually do not have the
option of making their own private arrangements for
waste collection  in lieu of paying for it through 
their taxes, and the services they receive are limited
to those their municipal government provides. In
contrast, many multi-residential, industrial,
commercial, and institutional (ICI) waste collection
services are provided on a private, fee-for-service
basis. Multi-residential and commercial facilities that
can choose to use municipal services often do so, but
are also usually able to compare municipal fees to
those for private pickup. 
The Public and Private Provision of
Waste Services
Waste management, perhaps the most visible of local
government services, is a major component of local
government spending: in 2007, Canadian municipalities
spent more than $3 billion – about 5 percent of total
municipal government expenses – on waste services,
more than on public transit or housing (Statistics
Canada 2008). Although waste management is the most
common service that municipalities contract out to
private providers, snow removal and the operation and
maintenance of recreation facilities are also commonly
provided by contract (Hebdon and Jalette 2008).
Waste services can be broken down into three stages:
collection of solid waste from households and businesses;
recycling (collection and processing) of plastics, papers,
electronic waste, industrial and construction waste,
organic materials, and so on; and disposal of non-
recycled products at landfills or incinerators or their use
in waste-to-energy facilities. Disposal  covers a wide
range of activities, from trucking waste to final sites to
the operation of those sites.
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Thanks to Margaret Booth, Susan Martin, and Jim Simos at the Ontario Ministry of Municipal Affairs and Housing for providing the
municipal data used in this paper. Robert Hebdon also kindly provided data on US and Canadian services contracting rates. Thanks to Phil
Bergevin, Colin Busby, Bev Dahlby, Don Dewees, Andrew Green, Robert Hebdon, Finn Poschmann, Michael Trebilcock, and anonymous
reviewers who provided excellent feedback throughout. They bear no responsibility for the content of this paper.
1 See the appendix for a list of which waste services fall into each category.2  A survey of US local governments conducted in 2007 found that 29 percent of inner-city governments, 57 percent of suburban governments,
and 39 percent of rural local governments privately contracted waste collection (Warner and Hefetz 2009). The level of service contracting
exists on a continuum of nearly exclusive provision of services by municipal employees to municipalities that do not even have employees but
contract out all services – examples at the latter end include Maywood, California, which has no direct employees (“Municipal Finances: There
Goes Everybody,” The Economist, July 8, 2010), and Sandy Springs, Georgia, where all services except for police and fire are provided through
a private contractor (Stanek and Gilroy 2005). Walls, Macauley, and Anderson (2002) find that, in the United States, local governments that
own and operate landfills or other disposal sites are more likely to have municipal staff provide waste and recycling collection services.
3 Calgary had private (not contracted) residential recycling collection until 2009, when it introduced municipal-wide single-family residential
recycling collection exclusively by public employees. In Vancouver, solid waste collection in most multi-residential buildings is contracted
out, and the city has contracted out multi-residential recycling collection in the downtown core.
4 Peel Region, a regional municipality west of Toronto, provides all waste services for residents of Mississauga, Brampton, and Caledon.
5 Examples of publicly owned, privately operated waste processing facilities are the Edmonton Waste Management Centre; the Glanbrook Landfill
in Hamilton, Ontario; the Peel Integrated Waste Management Facility, Peel Region, Ontario; and Toronto’s Green Lane Landfill. Private
contractors also often own landfill facilities. Metro Vancouver uses a privately owned and operated landfill in the BC interior that was due to
shut down in 2010, although recent expansion plans will lengthen its operating life by at least a decade (British Columbia 2010). The regional
Metro Vancouver government, which is responsible for planning waste services in the area – although not direct waste service provision, which is
a local municipal responsibility – is moving forward with plans for a new disposal site for area municipalities, and is considering various degrees
of private involvement with respect to both landfills and the construction of a waste-to-energy facility at an estimated capital cost of nearly $500
million (Levelton 2010) and potentially a 20-year contract with the operator (Canadian Union of Public Employees 2010).
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In most of Canada, municipalities are responsible
for waste services. In areas with two sub-provincial
tiers of government – such as a regional, metropo-
litan, or county government – the responsibility often
lies with the higher-level municipality, which usually
collects the cost of the service as part of local taxes.
Many municipalities also now employ user-pay
systems, where the cost of waste services to users is
based on the amount of waste they produce (see
Kelleher, Robins, and Dixie 2005).
A 2004 survey found that 69 percent of 
Canadian cities and towns contracted out at least
some disposal services, and 85 percent contracted
out at least some residential and commercial waste
collection; in still other cases, waste services are
provided privately – that is, the municipality has 
no role in their provision. Surprisingly, perhaps,
Canadian municipalities are more likely than their
American counterparts to contract out for waste
services (Hebdon and Jalette 2008).
2
A Snapshot of Contracting Out in Canada
In all major cities in Canada except Calgary and
Vancouver,
3 private contractors are responsible
for at least a portion of the collection and
recycling of waste from single-family residential
areas (Table 1). That portion ranges from 20
percent in Toronto to approximately half in
Edmonton, Hamilton, and Montreal, to full
contracting in Peel Region
4 and Winnipeg.
Municipalities often delineate geographic areas,
such as neighborhoods, within their borders for
which potential contractors bid to supply
services. For example, Montreal contracts out
waste services on a borough-by-borough basis,
with about half the city now served by
contractors; Winnipeg contracts out collection
based on quadrants of the city. Often, economies
of scale make it cost effective for a single
contractor to provide multiple services. There is,
however, a wide range of ownership and operation
models for landfills and other final disposal sites.
Many municipalities own and operate their own
landfill facilities; in other cases, the municipality
owns the site but contracts out its operation.
5
There is also a wide range of service levels that
municipalities offer that may affect the waste 
costs per resident (shown in Table 1).
One of the reasons for the increasing popularity
of contracting out could be the fractious state of
labour relations in many Canadian cities. Since
1979, there have been 720 strikes by municipal
workers – including at least seven major stoppages
in Toronto and its amalgamated municipalities, five
in Montreal, and three in Vancouver – and the
average length of a strike was approximately two
months. Not all involved waste services employees,
but strikes by municipal employees halted garbage
collection in Vancouver in 2007, in Windsor in
2009, and in Toronto twice during the past decade.
C.D. Howe InstituteThe incidence of strikes has been declining,
however, with an average of 29 per year between
1979 and 2000 but fewer than 10 per year since
2000. Nonetheless, 7.4 million municipal employee
worker-days have been lost to work stoppages
nationwide since 1979.
6
Principles and Practices of Waste
Services Contracting
Competition motivates firms to keep prices low or
to improve service at a given price. Unlike normal
market competition, however, government
contracting in waste services entails competition for
access to the market. Once a firm holds a contract,
it is the only provider for the duration and coverage
6 These data are from Human Resources and Skills Development Canada (HRSDC), which has logged approximately 10,000 public and private
strikes since 1978 where at least four worker-days were lost; see Dachis and Hebdon (2010) for a summary of the data on strikes.
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Table 1: Waste Service Contracting in the Nine Largest Canadian Municipalities
Note: Municipalities also offer different levels of service not controlled for in estimating costs per resident. Total costs (and prices) of waste services are authors’
calculations from 2008 municipal gross total waste services (collection, diversion and disposal combined) operating and 2008 capital expenses on a non-
amortized basis. Sources: British Columbia Ministry of Community and Rural Development Local Government Statistics, Alberta Municipal Affairs, City of
Winnipeg 2009 Operating Budget, Ontario Ministry of Municipal Affairs and Housing Financial Information Return, Ville de Montreal 2009 budget (includes
Montreal City Council and Urban Agglomeration Council expenses); Total population is from 2006 Census for all municipalities; contracting information from




















































































































































cost per resident 
($ per person)
92 71 135 57 91 79 127 53 957 For example, Calgary’s request for proposals for city-wide recycling pickup had unclear conditions on how service complaints would affect the
liability of contractors. This potentially large liability led large waste contractors not to bid for the work (letter from John Hooper, Calgary district
manager, Waste Services, Inc., to the City of Calgary, November 21, 2006. Provided by the Canadian Federation of Independent Business).
8 Secondary market prices, however, are notoriously volatile, as demonstrated by the collapse of prices of recycled products in 2008. A greater
reliance on secondary markets to generate revenue thus increases the potential risk for contractors, which could require municipalities to offer
offsetting terms that reduce revenue volatility in the initial service delivery contract.
C.D. Howe Institute
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area of the contract. In granting that exclusive right,
a municipality therefore should define terms that
encourage the contractor to provide high-quality
service. The contract also should reflect the inherent
limitations associated with the inability to foresee
and cover every eventuality, provide for the
enforcement of its terms, and spell out the cost
savings, quality of service, and public employment
goals the municipality seeks. 
Contract Incompleteness
In theory, municipalities could negotiate contracts
that specify the exact terms of the appropriate
response to every possible contingency. In practice,
however, all contracts are subject to some
uncertainty (Williamson 2002). Again in theory, the
contracted and the contractor could reach an ideal
contract through renegotiation in later years so long
as there was some degree of risk sharing, no
contract-specific assets, and information on contract
performance that was verifiable by outside observers
such as citizens or the courts (Hart and Moore
1988). This renegotiation would occur throughout
the life of the contract and it would be in the best
interests of both parties to come to an agreement, as
each would want to obtain future contracts,
knowing that any given negotiation was just one of
a series of negotiations. In the absence of such
conditions, a municipality should hesitate to enter
into a contract that involves assets that cannot be
reused by other contractors or redeployed by the
same contractor in another municipality. In
contrast, services that use assets that can be used by
multiple municipalities are good candidates for
contracting out so long as service performance can
be measured. 
The terms of a contract that are not explicitly
specified – where the right to decide on the meaning
of undefined terms rests with one party to the
agreement – are known as “residual powers” (for a
discussion, see Hart 2003). Residual powers that
leave penalties open ended or at the sole discretion
of one party could drive out possible contractors or
derail a municipality that fears potentially high
liabilities for an outcome over which it might have
no control.
7 In a well-designed contract, the
allocation of residual powers might encourage better
performance. A typical feature of recycling
contracts, for example, is that service providers
retain residual rights over recycled products – that is,
they may bring to market the valuable recyclables
that they collect – which gives them the incentive to
bring in more recycled material than they otherwise
might and thereby increasing the amount that is
diverted from landfills and incinerators.
8
At the same time, a contract that is too specific
about how services must be provided – for example,
by designating the use of particular trucks or types
of technology – reduces opportunities for
innovation by contractors. Instead, contract terms
should specify standards of outcomes, such as the
frequency of service, the number of customer
complaints, and other clearly definable goals that
municipal staff, not just the contractor, can measure
(see Walls 2003). For example, the municipality
could provide incentive payments for recyclable
products that the contractor actually sells to the
recycling market, rather than paying for recyclables
simply to be collected, since they could be disposed
of in landfills.
Finally, in requesting bids for a service contract,
the municipality should be clear about the criteria it
will use to choose among competing tenders and
about the relative value it places on the quality of
service as opposed to low cost, so that bidders can
set out the appropriate service scenarios, for which
they might offer separate prices. 9 Such transaction costs represent, on average about 2 percent of the value of a contract (Wingerter 1991).
10 For an excellent overview of how US municipalities have structured performance measurement in waste contracts, see Walls (2003).
11 In fact, during the last decade American cities have been contracting work back in at a faster rate than they have contracted out (Hefetz and
Warner 2007). This is not necessarily a failure of competitive contracting as the ability to bring work back in-house lets contractors know their
jobs are always on the line. The return of services in-house may be a result of lobbying pressure (Hebdon and Jalette 2008).
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Monitoring and Enforcing Contract Performance 
A principal difficulty with contracting is to ensure
that the contractor complies with the terms of the
contract. One benefit of having a private contractor
provide a service, while government provides
oversight, is that the provider and regulator are then
separate bodies, which reduces the chances of an
internal conflict of interest, such as when a
municipality finds that it needs to discipline itself
for poor service delivery. However, monitoring and
negotiating the terms of a contract entail costs that
municipalities would not incur if municipal staff
provided the service.
9
Contract compliance can be enforced through, for
example, explicit penalties for failure to meet service
obligations ranging from monetary loss for minor
infractions to the revocation of the contract for
repeated or significant service failures. At the same
time, many factors that determine performance are
beyond the direct control of contractors, which the
contract’s terms should take into account. For
example, recycling rates are affected by municipal
and provincial regulations on how to sort and clean
recyclable products, by the mix of multi-residential
and single-family housing, and by municipal
recycling campaigns. In sum, contracts that specify
outcomes that are unrelated to the effort the
contractor provides are likely to fall short of targets
that otherwise would be possible to attain.
10
Contracting Out and Labour Relations
The key to better service is not necessarily private
operation, but an environment that encourages both
public and private providers to innovate by
improving service quality relative to costs. Indeed, in
managed competition, public employees bid
alongside private contractors and often win out: in
both the United Kingdom and the United States,
public employee unions historically have won
between 70 and 90 percent of contracts openly
tendered (Segal, Ifelayo, and Pescheck 2004; Bel and
Warner 2008). Efficient groups of public employees
may expand their operations beyond their own
municipality and offer their services region-wide.
A municipality that cannot step in if a provider fails
to meet the terms of the contract risks leaving its
residents without the service if another contractor is
not immediately available. That possibility argues for a
municipality’s retaining a core group of public
employees as a backstop in case of a contractor’s failure
to meet the contract, or if the contracting market
becomes less competitive in later rounds of bidding,
making municipal operation more cost effective.
11
Many current municipal labour contracts make it
difficult and expensive for municipal workers to be
laid off. Workers who cannot be cost-effectively laid
off or retrained for other municipal departments
could form a public work crew that could compete
alongside private contractors. Jalette and Warrian
(2002) found that approximately half of municipal
government collective agreements did allow for
contracting of services in 1998, up from less than
one-third in 1986. However, approximately half of
collective agreements and employees covered by all
types of collective agreements (in 2001, and for a
broader range of collective agreements than just
those in municipal governments) did not permit
contracting out if this resulted in a loss of work
hours or jobs.
In addition, Moore (1999) found that of over
2,200 employees in a number of local government
services in the US in the 1980s that were contracted
out, 7 percent of government workers were laid off,
and a further 7 percent retired. Sixty percent of
public employees affected by contracting went to
work for the private contractor and one-quarter
were placed in other government positions. Hebdon
(2006) finds that among local government
employees in the state of New York affected by
contracting between 1990 and 2000, 4.5 percent
were laid off, 36 percent were retrained for other
jobs in the same government and 23 percent moved
to the private firm. Overall, Hebdon (2006) finds12 However, the strike was averted. See “Possible strike won’t affect garbage pickup,” Ottawa Citizen, July 11, 2010; available online at:
http://www.ottawacitizen.com/business/Possible+strike+affect+garbage+pickup/3263109/story.html
13 In 2009, municipalities in Canada switched to a full accrual accounting system for financial reports, which include amortization costs.
Municipal budgets, however, are still not required to, and often do not, use full accrual accounting.
14 Ontario municipalities receive a rebate on the goods and services tax (GST) they pay, and an amount equal to 78 percent of the harmonized
sales tax (HST) they pay. They also do not pay corporate income taxes. Moreover, a corporation that is willing to provide a contracted service
also expects to earn a profit from doing so, and to have that profit taxed, whereas municipalities have no such expectations.
15 To implement this, municipalities would need to include GST and HST paid, less any rebate they would receive, in their bid amounts. To
calculate the equivalent corporate taxes, municipalities could estimate the corporate taxes due on a given rate of return on the value of the bid
that would approximate corporate profits. Municipalities would also have to compare contractors’ costs with existing municipal costs by
including interest on funds to purchase vehicles, rent for buildings, and the opportunity costs of assets to create a comparable public cost of
waste services. This calculation, however, does not take into account different economic costs of taxes used by different levels of government
that finance either the municipal sales tax rebates or the municipal expenses on waste services. 
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that their wages and benefits did not appreciably
change and that the results were not as bleak for
workers as others he cites predicted, but that there
were still some workers laid off or who received lower
wages. Municipalities concerned with preserving jobs
could create contracts that would permit municipal
employees the right of first refusal on jobs offered by
private contractors, or would provide other incentives
for the contractors to hire displaced workers.
Contracted services are not strike free. Many private
waste service providers employ unionized workers who
have the full right to strike – as recently as mid-
August, 2010, one of Ottawa’s private waste services
providers, Waste Management, Inc., was threatened
by a stoppage.
12 A municipality also could require, as a
contract term, that the private provider have a
collective agreement in place with its employees that
covers the duration of the service contract or that the
contractor have a contingency plan to ensure services
are provided as normal during a strike. 
Municipal Operating Costs versus 
Contracting Costs
A municipality ought to  be able to quantify how
much might be saved by contracting out services
instead of providing them itself. The calculation,
however, is not a simple matter of comparing the
gross cost per tonne or per household of waste
services. Contracting out also could entail,
depending on the labour contract in place, severance
pay to workers who are transferred out of their jobs,
as well as a change in pension costs. Contracting out
also might lead to higher administrative costs.
Moreover, capital costs are accounted for
differently in the private and public sectors. A
municipality might have a lower cost of borrowing
than private companies do, allowing it to invest in
larger and newer vehicle fleets, for example. As well,
unlike a corporation, a municipality often does not
amortize capital costs over the useable lifetime of an
asset, making the true lifetime cost unclear in annual
budgets.
13 A municipality also does not pay the same
taxes that a corporation does,
14 potentially disadvan-
taging private contractors in bidding – indeed, the
exemption of municipalities from taxes levied by
higher-order governments is an implicit subsidy of
municipal services in place of private contractors. The
solution to this is to have public departments, when
bidding alongside private contractors, include in their
bids the taxes that private contractors would have to
pay. The inclusion of these other taxes might make
the public sector bids more expensive from the
standpoint of the municipality – as a Dutch study by
Dijkgraaf and Gradus (2007) shows – but it would
remove the implicit subsidy to municipal operation
and make the overall contract costs neutral.
15
Maintaining Competitive Services Provision
Over Time
Waste management contracts raise the potential for
anti-competitive behaviour by private operators,
leading to higher costs for municipalities. For
example, privatization in areas of Spain with little
competition resulted in progressively declining
savings from contracting (Bel and Costas 2006); in
the Netherlands, the cost savings from contracting
out were substantial at first, but collusion among, and
entrenchment of, private contractors led to reduced
cost savings over time (Dijkgraaf and Gradus 2007).
With disposal contracts, in particular, a contractor’s16 Bel and Fageda (2008) find that, in Spain, large national waste firms are especially prominent in large markets with waste contracting, but that
smaller firms are more prevalent in smaller towns with contracts.
17 In Indianapolis, managed competition resulted in city staff submitting the lowest bid in four out of 11 waste districts, but, like all operators,
they were limited by local rules to holding a maximum of three contracts (Savas 2005).
18 Ottawa, for example, tenders out waste and recycling collection contracts for six-year periods.
19 The more recent data I have collected on municipal waste services in Ontario municipalities, as discussed later in the paper, do not provide
information on wage rates of municipal or contracted employees, unlike previous Canadian studies.
ownership of a local disposal site could increase the
cost of service in later rounds when other disposal
sites cannot be built easily. Conversely, contracting
out the provision of services while maintaining
ownership of facilities increases the risk that a
contractor will reduce costs for the duration of the
contract in a way that increases long-term costs – for
example, by not properly maintaining the facility it
operates under contract (Hart 2003). These risks can
be partly ameliorated through contract terms that
specify asset conditions at the start and end of the
contract or that specify liabilities to a contractor for its
actions that have long-term costs to the municipality,
the environment, or subsequent contractors.
One way to encourage competition and a diversity
of bidders is to split collection contracts into large areas
on which major waste operators may bid, and into
smaller districts where contractors of different sizes
might be competitive with one another
16 – although
the need for economies of scale means making a
tradeoff between competition and the most cost-
effective size of operation.
17 Similarly, the contract
duration must strike a balance between being long
enough to permit a contractor to recoup its investment
in capital, but short enough that a contractor does not
have a lengthy monopoly on the market.
18 One
solution to providing city-specific assets is for
municipalities to maintain ownership, but to contract
out staff operations of immobile and specialized capital,
such as disposal sites, and to have only basic bid criteria
on the need for other assets, such as trucks, that allow
capital assets to be used by multiple municipalities.
The Evidence on Contracting Out
Waste Services 
In a 1997 survey of 279 Canadian cities, 59 percent
relied exclusively on collection contractors, 13
percent had a mixed public-private arrangement,
and 25 percent had exclusive public provision
(McDavid 2000, 2001). Private solid waste
contractors were 20 percent less costly to
municipalities than public workforces, due to the
former’s younger vehicle fleets, greater vehicle
capacity, fewer workers per truck, and (on average)
one-third more households serviced per collection
crew, suggesting higher capital investment and
productivity on the part of private contractors.
In a survey of Ontario waste providers, Dewees, et
al. (1993) found that hourly wage and benefit costs
for private contractors were 30 percent lower than
those for public employees, total labour costs were
40 percent lower for private contractors,
19 and the
number of waste pickups per route and the number
of routes completed by private contractors were
double those by public employees. Moreover, public
employees took substantially more sick days per year
(14) than did private contractor employees (2).
Although capital costs per truck were slightly higher
for private contractors than for public employees for
trucks of the same capacity, capital costs per tonne
were lower because of higher collection rates per
worker and per route for private operators.
There are, however, relatively few savings from
contracting out residential recycling pickup and
landfill operation (McDavid and Laliberte 1998,
1999; McDavid and Mueller 2008). Factors that
contractors cannot control, such as the share of a
city’s population that recycles and how much and
what must be recycled, are more important
determinants of cost than the choice of public 
versus private provider.
The international evidence on cost savings from
waste contracting is slightly more mixed, but 12 of
18 studies from eight different countries surveyed by
Bel and Warner (2008) find that costs were lower
for contracted waste services than for services
provided by public workers without a competitive
tendering process. Privatization alone does not
reduce costs, but much evidence shows that the
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Independent ￿ Reasoned ￿ Relevant C.D. Howe Institute 20 In Winnipeg, for example, commercial solid waste collection businesses complied with a Competition Bureau request to change contract length
and renewal terms that stymied competition (Competition Bureau 2008a, 2008b). Waste operators also operated under consent orders from
the Competition Bureau to divest landfill assets and offer cost-based access to landfills following two separate mergers (Competition Bureau
1997, 1998).
21 The index is calculated as the sum of the squares of the market shares of each market participant. For example, if, among four firms, two each
held 25 percent, one held 20 percent, and one 30 percent, the Herfindahl Index would be 2550 (252 + 252 + 202 + 302). In the analysis, I use
bid results for 18 separate contracts for a range of cities in Ontario from a survey of private waste operators and 37 recycling contracts provided
by Waste Diversion Ontario (REIC Perth 2005). Although this is just a sample of the contracts offered in Ontario cities, the information on
these contracts comes from contract winners, losers, municipalities themselves, and from a province-wide waste division agency, suggesting that
the sample is representative of waste service contracts in the province.
22 See United States, Department of Justice, “The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index;” available online at
http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/testimony/hhi.htm
23 Bid results for municipalities in northern Ontario are unavailable.
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existence of a competitive tendering system results
in cost savings provided by either public employees
or private contractors. As well, in the case of private
contractors, cost savings can occur because of  better
use of technology and higher worker productivity
arising from more flexible work practices.
To update these past surveys, I conducted an
empirical analysis of municipal waste services in
Ontario using the most recent available data. I look
first at the degree of competition in the Ontario
municipal waste contract market, and then turn to
the relationship between average municipal costs
and the extent of contracting out.
Competition in the Ontario Waste 
Management Industry
A frequent concern about municipal waste 
contracts is that the market might not be competi-
tive, resulting in possible collusion among market
participants and higher prices for contracting
municipalities.
20 Economic theory suggests,
however, that the likelihood of collusion can be
reduced by increasing the number of market
participants and bidders on contracts. Backing this
theory, McDavid (2000, 2001) found that contracts
with at least five bidders had costs that were 29
percent lower per household than contracts with
only one or two bidders, and that 79 percent of
municipal waste contracts put out to tender received
at least three bids. 
To update these findings, I obtained the bid
results of a number of recycling, waste, and organic
collection contracts in Ontario, and used a standard
objective metric called a Herfindahl Index to
measure the extent to which the market is concen-
trated in a few firms.
21 Using the annual market
value of waste contracts reveals that the Ontario
waste collection industry has a Herfindahl Index 
of 1609, a value that represents a “moderately
concentrated” sector. In the United States, for
example, the Department of Justice considers a
market to be “concentrated” if the Herfindahl 
Index is above 1800.
22
The degree of competition also depends on the
size and scope of the market. My analysis assumes
that the market is Ontario-wide and that the scope
of services provided includes all types of residential
collection, a justifiable measure in that the province’s
municipalities use similar workforces and
equipment and in that non-fixed equipment is likely
mobile across the province. Indeed, many of the
same companies bid on waste collection contracts all
over the province.
23 One should caution, however,
that such an arbitrary definition of the market
obscures the possibility that local markets might
have little competition. If price-fixing were to occur
in local markets, economic theory would suggest
that providing immunity policies for the first firm to
disclose information on price fixing cartels would
offer an incentive to break the cartel and inform the
Competition Bureau, thus weakening competitors
in the cartel. As the number of firms bidding for a
contract increases, it would become harder to
maintain an implicit or explicit agreement to keep
prices high, as the gains to an individual member of
remaining in the cartel would shrink. In sum, the
market for waste collection services in Ontario does
not appear to be heavily concentrated, although it
does appear to be moderately concentrated.
Competition in the sector could be increased,Commentary 308 | 9
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24 Specifically, I looked at net operating expenses, which include revenues that municipalities earn on the sale of recyclable materials. Although the
FIR has changed little since its introduction in 2000, there were many inconsistencies in the data reported that year, so I exclude it from the
analysis. The most recent and most comprehensive survey of Canadian municipal waste services is that of McDavid (2000, 2001), but the
single year of data available to him did not permit an analysis that controls for city-specific factors that are constant over time. However,
because McDavid surveyed a number of municipalities, his work has a broader range of information for cities across Canada (not just Ontario),
such as wages, the number of workers, types of trucks used, unionization, and the type of services offered.
25 Some Ontario municipalities allocate general city-wide administrative costs to each individual department. This is known as ‘allocation of
program support.’ Municipalities allocate general government expenses to departments on a different basis; the analysis conducted in this paper
excludes these general administrative expenses. There is little correlation between reported amounts of allocation of program support and the
percentage of budgets that are contracted out, making this a reasonable approach. 
26 In estimating capital amortization, I regarded 10 years as the useful asset life of waste facilities and vehicles, on the same basis as the US Internal
Revenue Service in its depreciation tables, available online at http://www.irs.gov/publications/p946/ar02.html
however, if municipalities took steps such as limiting
the amount of local market share that an individual
contractor may obtain or splitting contracts into a
mix of large and small that would open them to a
wider range of potential bidders.
Waste Services Contracting and Municipal
Government Costs
To assess how contracting out affects the costs to
municipalities, I looked at data covering the period
2001 to 2008 from each municipality’s  Financial
Information Return (FIR), a standardized form of
the Ontario Ministry of Municipal Affairs and
Housing (OMMAH) that all municipalities
complete annually. The FIR provides operating
costs, capital expenses, and other statistical
information.
24 It also provides details on the amount
spent on contracts by type of service, whether that
be waste collection, diversion (recycling), or
disposal,
25 so I omit municipalities that report only
consolidated operating costs, rather than costs for
each service. Some municipalities also report on
cross-boundary service agreements, whereby they
purchase, receive, give, sell, or provide waste services
jointly with other municipalities. Further, most
Ontario municipalities report – as part of the
Municipal Performance Measurement Program
(MPMP), also administered by the OMMAH – the
number of tonnes of waste they collect, recycle, and
dispose of; see the appendix for details on the
classifications of services and data used.
In comparing private versus public costs, capital
costs present a particular difficulty. Municipalities
report their annual capital spending on waste
services on a different basis than do private
companies, whose costs are reflected in their bid
price. Because the initial capital stocks of cities are
not known and therefore cannot be amortized
appropriately, I use unamortized annual capital
expenses as the estimate of municipal capital costs.
This is likely to be a fair approximation for cities
that maintain constant levels of capital stock, as the
annual expenditure amounts would represent the
replacement investment per year. Other methods of
amortization or estimates of capital costs, in fact, 
do not change the results. Thus, to approximate
public capital and private costs, I use the reported
annual capital expenses of municipalities in the
empirical tests presented below.
26
The Ontario municipalities that I analyze
collectively spent nearly $1 billion on waste services
in 2008, over $600 million of it on contracted
services. It was not possible, however, to identify
those municipalities whose staff won a contract to
provide services, thus not necessitating any
contracting out. Hence, in my dataset, expenditures
on municipal staff who win tendered contracts are
not recorded as contracted expenses. As McDavid
(2001) shows, however, mixed private-public
operations are much rarer forms of service provision
in Canada than exclusively private or public
operations, suggesting that this assumption does 
not result in substantially underestimating the
percentage of budgets that are subject to a
contracting process. If anything, this potential
underestimation problem makes it more likely 
that I will not find benefits from the contracting
process and, therefore, could underestimate 
the cost savings from contracting out. | 10 Commentary 308
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COSTS AND CONTRACTING OUT IN ONTARIO
MUNICIPALITIES: I measure municipal contracting by
the percentage of each municipal waste division’s
operating costs that is spent on contracted services.
For example, if a municipality reports that its only
waste service expense is for contracted services, I
report it as having 100 percent contracting;
conversely, I assume that a municipality that reports
no expenses on contracted services has zero
contracting. The extent of contracting out changed
little in Ontario for most services from 2001
through 2008, with the only noticeable increase
coming in waste diversion: on average, 76 percent of
waste diversion budgets were contracted out in
2001, rising to 83 percent in 2007.
Costs per tonne of all types of waste services are
lower in cities in the top quartile of those that
contract out than in cities in the bottom quartile
(see Table 2). Except for waste diversion, the same is
true for costs per household. Unlike waste diversion
and collection services, more than 80 percent of
which is contracted out in three-quarters of the
cities in the sample, the contracting rate for disposal
services exceeds 50 percent in fewer than half. A
caveat:  municipalities in the top quartile of diversion
and collection contracting happen to be cities with
low population densities, thus possibly resulting in
different cost structures for these municipalities that
could be the main determinant of cost savings.
ISOLATINGTHE COST SAVINGS FROM CONTRACTING
OUT: Inter-municipal comparisons have a number of
limitations. For example, the services municipalities
offer differ: some might have an organic solid waste
collection program such as the “Green Bin” in
Toronto and Ottawa; others might have a more
comprehensive recycling pickup program that result
in higher costs per household or per tonne.
Municipalities could also have higher costs owing to
specific local factors, such as landfills or transfer
stations in remote areas. Large, dense municipalities
likely will have operating structures and costs that
differ from those of small, less dense rural areas,
making direct comparisons more difficult.
27These
characteristics also vary with the degree to which
municipalities contract out. To control for these
problems, I look at the data from a municipality
over a seven-year period to see how costs per tonne
or per household changed with changes in the share
of the budget that is contracted out, and control for
characteristics of municipalities that do not change
much over time, such as average density or size.
28
In the following analysis of how contracting relates
to average costs, I apply a hypothetical test that
compares one municipality that fully contracts out
expenses and another that has no contracted expenses;
in all other respects, the two are similar. In reality, most
municipalities contract out an amount between these
extremes; thus, the estimated costs savings presented
below apply only to that portion of a municipality’s
waste budget yet to be contracted out. For example, a
municipality that has already contracted out 50 percent
of its waste services budget would realize savings only
on the remaining 50 percent.
THE COST SAVINGS PERTONNE AND PER
HOUSEHOLD FROM CONTRACTING OUT: Looking 
at costs per tonne, the results suggest contracting
out leads to savings of 56, 49, and 33 percent for
disposal, recycling, and collection services,
respectively.
29The accuracy of the estimates is
hampered, however, by the fact that municipalities
27 In the regressions, I include yearly variables of population and number of households (both in unadjusted and logarithmic terms) to account
for fast-growing cities. Including these variables does not appreciably change the results.
28 By starting the analysis with 2001, I did not have to worry about changes in the size of municipal governments, such as the amalgamations of
Toronto (1998), Sudbury, Norfolk County, Kawartha Lakes, Haldimand County, Hamilton, or Ottawa (all on January 1, 2001). Efficiency
gains these cities might have experienced immediately after amalgamation could be confused with possible gains from post-amalgamation
changes in their approaches to contracting out. This issue, however, affects only a small number of municipalities in the analysis, which are
excluded from the regression analysis. I present full regression results for both an ordinary least squares and fixed effects regression in the
appendix.
29 Only one-third of Ontario municipalities report the number of tonnes of waste they collect, recycle, or dispose of. Although the effect of
contracting out is empirically large in terms of collection operating costs per tonne, the result falls just short of statistical significance at the 10
percent level using robust standard errors. This may be because of the smaller sample size of the subset of cities that report the number of
tonnes of waste collected.Commentary 308 | 11
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are not required to report data on waste tonnage.
Moreover, those municipalities that do report the
tonnage of waste they collect are six to seven times
larger than those that do not, which tends to bias
the results. In addition, there are significant
discrepancies in the tonnage amounts in some
municipalities’ reports, which also makes the data
suspect.
30 A more reliable measure, therefore, is costs
per household. Using this metric, a municipality’s
costs are estimated to be 31 percent less for both
collection and disposal services and 34 percent less
for recycling services that are fully contracted out
compared with the costs for an otherwise similar
municipality with no contracting out (Table 3). The
implementation of household organic programs
does not appear to have influenced costs.
31
Table 2: Average Costs per Tonne and Household of Waste Services in Ontario Municipalities, by 
Quartile Percentage of Budget Contracted (2001-2008)
Note: Prices are in real 2002 dollars. Quartiles are created to form equally sized groups of municipalities.
Municipalities are grouped by the how much they contract their waste services relative to other municipalities, rather than creating arbitrary categories of
comparison based on the percentage of budgets that are contracted out. Results are similar regardless of how the sample of municipalities is divided.
Source: Author’s calculations from OMMAH. 
Contracting percentage quartile
0-25 25-50 50-75 75-100 Provincial
average
Collection Average percent of operating budget contracted 32 83 93 100 77
Costs per tonne ($) 121 77 81 92 94
Costs per household ($) 56 51 56 50 52
Tonnes collected (000s) 55 39 17 12 32
Households served (000s) 44 24 12 9 16
Population density (people/sq km) 383 277 262 133 190
Number of municipalities providing service 350
Recycling Average percent of operating budget contracted 35 83 94 100 78
Costs per tonne ($) 226 152 211 165 187
Costs per household ($) 46 37 33 32 34
Tonnes recycled (000s) 35 21 13 29 23
Households served (000s) 34 23 13 19 16
Population density (people/sq km) 216 345 214 122 190
Number of municipalities providing service  322
Disposal Average percent of operating budget contracted 7 29 57 91 46
Costs per tonne ($) 133 154 83 78 110
Costs per household ($) 103 100 84 62 86
Tonnes disposed (000s) 47 48 95 38 53
Households served (000s) 14 15 36 17 16
Population density (people/sq km) 116 142 233 256 190
Number of municipalities providing service 297
30 For example, the Ontario Municipal Chief Administrative Officer’s Benchmarking Initiative reports that waste collection cost Toronto $71,
$83, and $89 per tonne in 2006, 2007, and 2008. The FIR data, however, suggest costs of   $76, $68 and $69 in those years. Some returns
obviously have mistaken tonnes between collection and recycling. The FIR financial data and household counts are likely more reliable, as they
are subject to numerous checks in the FIR submission process.
31 Tests were run that included data from Waste Diversion Ontario on the tonnes of organic material collected by each municipality in the
province from 2002 through 2008. Details on these tests are available from the author.| 12 Commentary 308
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32 This conclusion stems from the statistically insignificant coefficients in Appendix Table A-3.
THE EXTENT OF CONTRACTING OUT: Are the cost
savings constant as a municipality increases
contracting out from zero to 100 percent? or do the
lowest average costs come somewhere between these
two extremes? Cost savings, in fact, vary in complex
ways, with average costs per household falling as the
percentage of the budget for waste diversion and
collection that is contracted out increases from 50
percent to 100 percent, while costs per household
for all waste services are lowest when 100 percent of
the budget is contracted out. Predicted costs per
household for diversion and collection services are
highest when a municipality contracts out between
40 and 50 percent of services, rather than when they
do not contract out any services. 
For waste disposal, costs per household are
highest when there is no contracting, and predicted
costs fall continuously as contracting out increases as
a share of the budget. However, the incremental
reduction in costs from additional contracting out
lessens as the share approaches 100 percent, so that
the additional savings from fully contracting out, as
opposed to partial contracting out, disposal are not
as large as in the case of collection or diversion.
32
None of these estimates, however, includes cost
savings that already might have occurred through
managed competition. Municipalities might place a
value on retaining a core public service, either
because of labour contracts that would lead to high
costs in other departments if waste service
employees were transferred or laid off, or because of
the potential insurance value of a public service
backstop.
This finding that costs are minimized when
services are fully contracted, and not partially
contracted, might result from increased competition
for a larger share of available services. There might
be only limited competition when municipalities
put just a portion of their waste services up for bid,
or costly duplication of municipal and private
contractor administrative, capital, or other costs
among public and private waste crews. 
One other potential explanation for this finding 
is that cities that contract out 100 percent of their
waste budget have also driven down administrative
and overhead costs. There is likely to be little
difference in the extent of services contracted out
between municipalities with, say, 95 percent of
expenses contracted out and those with 100 percent
contracted out. The difference in reported
contracting percentage may be because of
municipalities that retain some overhead and
administrative costs in the waste services
department, rather than under general municipal
administration. Municipalities that have reduced
their waste services’ overhead costs have, by
construction, increased the share of their waste
services budget that is contracted out and likely have
also reduced the total cost of providing services. 
For all municipalities, however, administrative costs
average 7 to 8 percent of the total, which suggests
that the fall in average costs as the share of
contracting out rises above 50 percent of the budget
is due to more than just the reduction of
administration costs. 
Indeed, whether services are contracted or
whether services are provided by municipal staff,
some administration costs will be inevitable, either
Disposal operating costs Recycling operating costs Collection  operating costs
Difference in average cost per household -31% -34% -31%
Table 3: Difference in Per Household Costs for Municipalities with Full versus No Contracting
Note: All results are statistically significant at least at the 5 percent level. Cost savings are regression coefficients (transformed from logarithms) that represent a
comparison of costs between a municipality with no contracting to an otherwise similar municipality with full contracting. 
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to administer contracts or to manage municipal
workforces. In practice, these general administrative
costs don’t tend to differ much in varying degrees of
contracting, as evidenced by the City of Windsor
(2010) not including general administrative costs in
its comparison of contracting versus municipal
operation of waste services in its recently conducted
waste service contract.
PRIVATE CONTRACTORS VERSUS INTER-MUNICIPAL
COOPERATION: So far, I have not distinguished
between contracts that municipalities enter into
with private companies and those they sign with
other municipalities. Approximately 20 percent of
municipalities have contracts with other
municipalities for the provision of diversion or
disposal services, and 10 percent have contracts for
collection services – most of them with an upper-
tier municipality.
33 Many municipalities jointly use
the same waste disposal site if the efficient scale of
operation is above what a single municipality
requires; similarly, one particular municipality’s
recycling or collection services might prove to be the
most cost-efficient provider in an area, including
private contractors, and economies of scale again
might lead municipalities to combine operations.
Does it matter if municipalities contract out waste
services to private providers as opposed to other
municipalities?
34 For waste disposal and diversion
services, the answer is no: it does not matter if these
services are contracted out to either other
municipalities or to private contractors. The costs
savings emerge just from the contracting process,
and cost savings are independent of which party
earns the contract. Cost savings from the
contracting process are 36 percent in disposal
services and 23 percent in diversion services.
For collection, the story is different. When
collection services are contracted out to private
providers, municipalities derive cost savings of 
24 percent. But they derive little cost savings from
contracting out to other municipalities.
35Thus,
contracting in collection services only appears to
save money in the Ontario context when private
contractors are used. Identifying the definitive
reasons behind this finding is beyond the scope of
available evidence, but possible reasons based on
past evidence cited in the previous section range
from higher productivity of private workers, wage
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33 A municipality is deemed to be in a contract with another municipality when it reports that it provides services jointly with, or purchases or
receives services from, another municipality, either upper- or lower-tier. A municipality that reports that waste services are not its responsibility
or not applicable to it, mainly small towns or municipalities where upper-tier municipalities are responsible for, and finance, waste services, is
not considered to have a cross-border service agreement. When cities do not report any form of cross-border purchase, we assume that all
contracted expenses are with private contractors. Likewise, we assume that cities with intergovernmental contracts only have intergovernmental
contracting expenses. If cities with a cross-boundary agreement have at least some private contracting and private contractors are indeed lower-
cost providers than other municipalities, this assumption will bias the estimates towards finding that private contracting does not result in cost
savings. The estimates of the cost savings from private contracting are thus likely to be a lower-bound estimate
34 Specifically, I tested the interaction effect of the percentage of a municipality’s budget that is contracted out with whether or not the municipality
uses a private contractor. As mentioned above, the percentage of a budget that is contracted out is not representative if municipal staff members
are permitted to bid on and win contracts, as this leads to an underestimation of the extent to which operations are competitively contracted out.
35 In fact, few municipalities have cross-border collection contracts, suggesting that the finding that only private contracting leads to lower costs
may be due to only a few municipalities reporting higher costs with inter-municipal contracting.
Disposal Collection Recycling
Contracting in general -36%* 7%* -23%*
Private Contracting 4%* -24%* 1%*
Table 4: Change in Cost per Household From Types of Contracting
Note *Effect of private disposal and diversion contracting, and contracting in general in collection services are not statistically significant at even the 10 percent
level of significance. Cost savings are regression coefficients (transformed from logarithms) that represent a comparison of costs between a municipality with no
contracting to a municipality with full contracting.
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and benefits savings, or perhaps  better use of
technology by private contractors.
TOTAL MUNICIPAL COST SAVINGS FROM
CONTRACTING OUT: How much would major
Canadian municipalities that have contracted out
only a small amount of their waste services save if
they were to contract out fully? Taking the
difference between the current level of contracting
and fully contracting out and multiplying the
estimated costs savings per household (from Ontario
data in Table 3) of extending contracting out by the
number of households not served by contractors
reveals that Toronto has the most to gain, with
potential savings of almost $50 million annually,
representing about 24 percent of the current waste
services budget;
36 other Ontario municipalities
would see proportionally similar savings, although
actual savings will differ from those predicted here
(Table 5).
37 Using the same criteria, Vancouver and
Calgary would save up to $14 million and $23
million per year, respectively. For just Vancouver,
Calgary, Windsor, London, Hamilton and Toronto,
annual savings from fully contracting out waste
services would be more than $100 million. Ontario
municipalities such as Oshawa, Whitby, Guelph,
Thunder Bay, and Kingston, which contract out less
than 20 percent of their collection or disposal
budgets, could realize cumulative savings of another
$5 million. 
These forecasts do not take into account potential
differences in savings among municipalities but
assume that the average savings of 31 percent for
collection and disposal services and 34 percent for
recycling services apply generally.
38 Local factors such
as the terms of existing collective agreements with
employees, the amount of competition among waste
services providers, and the opportunities for inter-
municipal cooperation also could affect the estimates.
Table 5: Estimated Annual Cost Savings From Contracting All Waste Services For Municipalities With Little
Waste Contracting
Note: Prices are in 2008 dollars. 
Source: Author’s calculations from OMMAH and City of Calgary and City of Vancouver waste services budgets.








36 In 2008, 15 percent of Toronto’s collection budget was contracted out; thus, the cost savings of 31 percent per household that were derived in
the earlier analysis would apply only to the 85 percent of the budget that was not already contracted out. Most of the savings would come from
contracting out collection and diversion, as the city’s disposal services are already heavily contracted out. I repeat this for all municipalities and
for each waste service using the relevant savings estimate for each from Table 3.
37 A City of Windsor (2010) staff report finds that fully contracting out waste collection and recycling would save the city approximately $2.1
million per year; I estimate that adding the full contracting out of waste disposal services, which the Windsor staff report does not consider,
would result in a further $1 million in savings.
38 However, since the finding that savings appear to be robust to different regression specifications of the percentage of contracting out and the
inclusion of service level indicators (such as the amount of household organic waste collected per household), the results likely apply generally.Commentary 308 | 15
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Policy Recommendations
Most Canadian municipalities contract out the
provision of at least some of their waste manage-
ment services. Those that have not already fully
contracted out these services – including Toronto,
Calgary, Vancouver, and major cities in Ontario –
could save their taxpayers substantial amounts of
money by doing so. Previous analyses suggest that
the cost savings come mainly from the higher
productivity of private-sector contractors relative to
that of municipal employees. If that is so, managed
competition that increases the productivity of
public-sector employees might reap many of the
cost-saving benefits of private contracting. At the
same time, however, cities that fully contract out
waste collection and recycling services tend to have
the lowest operating costs, although they expose
themselves to being held captive to incumbent
contractors’ rising costs in later rounds of bidding 
if competition for local contracts is reduced. Given
the savings they would gain, therefore, municipali-
ties that do not now tender their waste management
services should end their public service monopolies
and design contracts for waste services that include
the following:
￿ a quantitative standard by which to measure
whether the contract’s desired goal has been met;
￿ to increase diversion rates, incentive payments
for the amount of recyclable waste that
contractors sell to markets for recycled goods, not
just the amount they collect;
￿ to improve the quality of collection services,
penalties for the number of complaints the
municipality receives or another clearly definable
measure of the services contractors provide;
￿ ensuring that contracts encourage competition
and do not entrench incumbents, by contracting
out collection routes by sections of the city, with
contracts of varying size, and by contracting out
operations but maintaining facility ownership for
waste services with specialized assets, such as
landfills or more advanced disposal sites; and
￿ ensuring that contracts are politically and
practically acceptable – for example, by providing
incentives for public employees to continue
employment with contractors or the
municipality, perhaps by opening up bidding for
waste services to both private contractors and
current public employees. 
Municipal policymakers who contract out waste
services through a well-designed contracting
mechanism can reduce the costs of providing waste
services and limit the consequences on waste services
of municipal worker strikes. In undertaking this analysis, data from the FIR
and the MPMP were merged with 2006 Census
data on household characteristics, such as income
and average size of families, municipality size, and
municipality housing characteristics.
39
The OMMAH uses three waste services
categories: disposal, diversion, and collection.
Municipalities report their costs for a specific
service under one of these categories. Disposal
services include the administrative and direct
overhead expenses related to the following
services: depositing of garbage from all types of
property at a transfer station, landfill sites, and
incineration facilities; energy from waste facilities;
hauling; the perpetual care of active and closed
sites; solid waste landfill closure and post-closure;
and transfer station and other waste disposal
expenses. Waste diversion costs include the
administrative and direct overhead expenses of
backyard composting programs, a centralized
facility, the collection and processing of recyclable
material from all types of property – including
blue box items, bulky items, Christmas trees,
gardening waste, household hazardous waste, and
source-separated household organics – as well as
promotional expenses, the purchase and delivery
of blue boxes and source-separated organic bins,
and other recycling expenses. Collection expenses
include the administrative and direct overhead
expenses of garbage pickup except for diversion
and recycling (Ontario Ministry of Municipal
Affairs and Housing 2010).
The 450 Ontario municipalities for which data
were obtained and analyzed are a complete range
of types and sizes and contain 97 percent of the
province’s population and 40 percent of the
population of Canada. Although all municipalities
are required to fill out the FIR, not all have waste
services expenses: 356 report expenses for
collection services, 321 for recycling, and 297 for
disposal. I exclude municipalities that do not
report comprehensive cost data as they are also
likely not to have any waste operations to report
either because the service is handled by another
municipality or because it is “not applicable” to
them, usually because other levels of local
government have taken on that service.
I use regression estimates of average operating
costs per tonne of waste handled (Table A-1) and
per household (Table A-2) in each of disposal,
recycling, and collection. I use an ordinary least
squares regression model and a fixed effects
regression model. A fixed effects regression model
will control for observed and unobserved
municipality-specific factors.
40 For example, some
cities’ landfills might be particularly far from
urban areas or have different spatial structures.
For effects that vary from one year to another
but are the same for all municipalities, such as
fuel costs or weather, I include year-effects to
control for cost changes that might have
occurred in a given year. 
I also use quadratic estimates of contracting
out to establish the relationship between
contracting out and average costs per household
(Table A-3).
41 I find that average costs per
household peak when contracting out of
collection and recycling services is between 40
and 50 percent of total municipal waste expenses.
A strongly negative and statistically significant
coefficient in the fixed effects regression for
recycling and collection suggests that costs are
lowest at the highest percentage of contracting.
Similar results were found using a cubic
regression of contracting percentage.
39 I report all cost data in real terms in 2002 dollars using the consumer price index with the base year of 2002 using the 2005 basket of goods.
All empirical work was conducted using Stata/IC 10.1. All data and code used in this paper are available from the author upon request.
40 Because of possible data reporting problems, we exclude cities at the top and bottom 1 percent of costs per tonne of waste and costs per
household. I have found mistaken entries in the tonnage data in a handful of cases that I cannot correct. Excluding cities at the very top or
high end of costs per tonne will exclude cities that severely misreport their waste data.
41 I also tested cubic relationships of contracting percentage and costs per household.
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Variables Disposal Recycling Collection Disposal Recycling Collection
(operating costs per tonne)
Ordinary Least Squares Municipality Fixed Effects
Percentage of budget contracted -0.331 -0.460** -0.543*** -0.831*** -0.656** -0.345
(0.245) (0.177) (0.173) (0.221) (0.293) (0.251)
City is in Northern Ontario -0.222 -0.0507 -0.260*
(0.225) (0.215) (0.153)
Population 4.66e-06*** -2.39e-06 -1.80e-06*
(1.45e-06) (1.51e-06) (1.03e-06)
Number of households -1.16e-05*** 7.55e-06* 4.73e-06*
(3.88e-06) (4.07e-06) (2.81e-06)
Land area in square km (2006) 4.05e-05 2.91e-05 4.42e-05
(6.77e-05) (7.56e-05) (7.86e-05)
Population density per square km 0.000125 -0.000323** -7.67e-06
(0.000167) (0.000124) (0.000116)
Average household income (2005) -5.67e-06 -8.28e-06 -4.40e-06
(1.34e-05) (7.70e-06) (5.80e-06)
Share of homes that are single detached 0.956* 0.364 0.651
(0.574) (0.520) (0.500)
Average number of persons per family -0.720 0.932* 0.0759
(0.733) (0.475) (0.405)
Municipality is upper tier -0.158 -0.322* 0.293*
(0.218) (0.166) (0.149)
Year effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of municipalities 97 106 103
Observations 440 509 505 440 509 505
R-squared 0.126 0.148 0.132 0.697 0.788 0.740
Ordinary Least Squares and Fixed Effect Regression of Operating Cost per Tonne
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors clustered by municipality. Costs per tonne are log transformations. Coefficients are thus percentage
changes. Coefficients of percent of budget contracted are percentage changes in costs per household of a change in contracting percentage from 0 to 100 percent
of operating budget.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Source: Author’s calculations from OMMAH. 
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Variables Disposal Recycling Collection Disposal Recycling Collection
(operating costs per household)
Ordinary Least Squares Municipality Fixed Effects
Percentage of budget contracted -0.480*** -0.396*** -0.0272 -0.365** -0.417*** -0.367**
(0.113) (0.112) (0.0977) (0.150) (0.157) (0.174)
City is in Northern Ontario 0.107 -0.278*** 0.409***
(0.0859) (0.0813) (0.0842)
Population 1.77e-06 -1.24e-06 -2.10e-06*
(1.68e-06) (1.37e-06) (1.27e-06)
Number of households -3.84e-06 3.22e-06 5.79e-06*
(4.38e-06) (3.70e-06) (3.26e-06)
Land area in square kilometers (2006) -0.000108 -1.79e-05 -0.000163**
(9.60e-05) (7.20e-05) (6.66e-05)
Population density per square kilometers -6.06e-05 -3.18e-05 -0.000110
(0.000165) (0.000120) (0.000103)
Average household income (2005) -6.64e-06 1.09e-05 1.21e-05**
(5.03e-06) (6.62e-06) (5.94e-06)
Share of homes that are single detached -0.0957 -1.449*** -0.478
(0.417) (0.329) (0.328)
Average number of persons per family -0.302 0.341 0.465*
(0.212) (0.209) (0.237)
Municipality is upper tier 0.0376 0.177 -0.0309
(0.256) (0.188) (0.204)
Year effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of municipalities 352 317 296
Observations 1,869 1,759 1,694 1,869 1,759 1,694
,
R-squared 0.070 0.199 0.103 0.803 0.778 0.831
Ordinary Least Squares and Fixed Effect Regression of Operating Cost per Household
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors clustered by municipality. 
Costs per household are log transformations. Coefficients of percent of budget contracted are percentage changes in costs per household of a change in
contracting percentage from 0 to 100 percent of operating budget.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Source: Author’s calculations from OMMAH. 
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Independent ￿ Reasoned ￿ Relevant C.D. Howe Institute 
Variables Disposal Recycling Collection Disposal Recycling Collection
(operating costs per household)
Ordinary Least Squares Municipality Fixed Effects
Percentage of budget contracted 0.740** 0.766* 0.400 -0.256 1.154*** 0.781*
(0.373) (0.448) (0.411) (0.324) (0.397) (0.472)
Percentage of budget contracted squared -1.224*** -1.051*** -0.404 -0.116 -1.420*** -1.038***
(0.352) (0.385) (0.396) (0.325) (0.297) (0.362)
Number of municipalities 352 317 296
Observations 1,869 1,759 1,694 1,869 1,759 1,694
R-squared 0.085 0.209 0.105 0.803 0.785 0.835
Quadratic Relationship Between Contracting and Average Cost
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors clustered by municipality. Other control variables are the same as in Table A1 and A2. Costs per
household and tonne are log transformations. Coefficients are percentage changes in costs of a change in contracting percentage from 0 to 100 percent of
operating budget.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Source: Author’s calculations from OMMAH. 
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